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mental processes and the men and women who participate in
them. Overall, I share Governor Cuomo's statement that "in
New York neither Republicans nor Democrats apologize for
Government: we use it intelligently, reasonably, proudly."'
This of course does not mean that the governmental
processes in New York are free from dispute; they are not and
they should not be. This Article is about a dispute between the
Executive and the Legislature. In this dispute I was an active
participant. My position allowed me to present information that
might not otherwise be available to an observer. However, during this dispute I was a strong advocate for the legislative position. This could have colored my presentation. I have tried to
avoid this problem by reconsidering all of the events described
and by reexamining all of the documents that relate to them in
my academic cap. As a result of this reexamination, I have included certain "inconvenient facts" 2 that I was not aware of at
the time of my participation. Nevertheless, I remain convinced
of the appropriateness of the Legislature's action.
I.

Introduction

On April 11, 1984, Governor Mario M. Cuomo of New York
signed the several appropriation bills that constituted the 19841985 New York State budget.' For the second consecutive year,
1. N.Y. Times, Feb. 16, 1985, at 26, col. 4.
2. See Weber, On Science as a Vocation, in SOCIOLOGY: THE CLASSIC STATEMENTS 16,
22 (M. Truzzi ed. 1971).
3. The Governor is required by the New York State Constitution to submit each
year to the legislature a budget along with bills for proposed appropriations, reappropriations, and revenues. N.Y. CONST. art. VII, §§ 2, 3. These bills are known as
"budget bills." N.Y. State Fin. Law § 24 (McKinney Supp. 1984-1985). The appropriation bills submitted in this fashion are: An Act Making Appropriations for the Support
of Government, State Operations Budget, ch. 50 (Jan. 17, 1984) (copy available at the
Pace Law Review) [hereinafter cited as State Operations Budget]; An Act Making Appropriations for the Support of Government Legislative and Judiciary Budget, ch. 51
(Mar. 31, 1984) [hereinafter cited as Legislative and Judiciary]; An Act Making Appropriations for the Legal Requirements of the State Debt Service, ch. 52 (Apr. 11, 1984)
[hereinafter cited as Debt Service]; An Act in Relation to the Aid to Localities Budget,
ch. 53 (Jan. 17, 1984) (copy available at the Pace Law Review) [hereinafter cited as Aid
to Localities]; An Act Making Appropriations for the Support of Government, Capital
Projects, ch. 54 (Apr. 11, 1984) [hereinafter cited as Capital Projects]. The designations
"State Operations," "Legislative and Judiciary," "Debt Service," "Aid to Localities," and
"Capital Projects" reflect appropriation uses and in all cases but the Legislative and
Judiciary, are comparable to the budget categories, fund types, or accounts within funds
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the budget had been adopted by the Legislature in a timely
fashion," resulting in editorial praise from across the State.6
Unique to this budget, however, was the inclusion of provisions
within the State Operations and Aid to Localities bills' that explicitly mandated staffing levels for the City University of New
York (CUNY), the State University of the State of New York
(SUNY), 8 the Office of Mental Health (OMH)9 and the Office of
Mental Retardation and Developmental Disabilities
(OMRDD).1 0 In addition, these staffing level provisions required
that the Director of the Budget" report to the chairpersons of
the respective legislative fiscal committees" on discrepancies be-

mandated by statute. See N.Y. STATE FIN. LAW §§ 22, 70, 72 (McKinney Supp. 19841985). Their designation is, however, a product of executive choice and custom, not law.
This is important with respect to certain arguments raised in support of the impoundments studied in this Article. See infra notes 157-60 and accompanying text. For a full
discussion of the New York State budget process, see infra notes 24-84 and accompanying text.
4. According to law, the budget bills need to be enacted by April 1, the first day of
the fiscal year. N.Y. STATE FIN. LAW § 3 (McKinney Supp. 1983-1984). During the prior
administration of Governor Hugh L. Carey (1974-1982), disputes over the funding of
medicaid abortions (1978, 1979), financial plan discrepancies (1980, 1982), and state assumption of the medicaid costs of localities (1981) delayed final passage of the budgets.
This caused considerable concern in the financial community, threatening the cost and
marketability of New York's debt.
5. See, e.g., N.Y. Times, Mar. 31, 1984, § 1, at 22, col. 1.
6. The State Operations and Aid to Localities bills are two of five appropriation bills
that comprised the 1984-1985 budget. See supra note 3.
7. See Aid to Localities, supra note 3, at 130.
8. See State Operations, supra note 3, at 332.
9. See id. at 216.
10. See id. at 220. The language that mandates staffing levels for CUNY, SUNY,
OMH, and OMRDD is similar. Thus the SUNY provision exemplifies each provision:
Plus an additional amount for services and expenses of various programs and
state operated institutions, excluding the state university hospitals, to support 391
additional staff to achieve an overall filled positions target of 27,519. Of this number, 93 positions shall be added as of July 1, 1984, another 204 shall be added as
of September 1, 1984, and another 94 as of February 1, 1985.
State Operations, supra note 3, at 332.
11. The Director of the Budget is a statutory position appointed by the governor.
N.Y. EXEc. LAW § 180 (McKinney 1982). The Director is responsible for:
assist[ing] the governor in his duties under the constitution and laws of the state
respecting the formulation of the budget and the correlating and revising of estimates and requests for appropriations of the civil departments, [and] assistling]
the governor in his duties respecting the investigation, supervision and coordination of the expenditures and other fiscal operations of such department.
Id.
12. The Assembly's fiscal committee is called the Committee on Ways and Means.
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tween legislative appropriations and actual staffing levels. ' The
inclusion of these provisions did not receive similar acclaim. Indeed, former New York Governor Hugh L. Carey suggested that
the inclusion of mandatory staffing levels weakened the Governor's control over his own agencies and over the state's finances."' One commentator cautioned that "the Governor's failure to resist the Legislature's incursions in budgeting may be
very damaging to the long-run health of the governorship."' 5

The Senate's fiscal committee is known as the Committee on Finance. Their duties are
set forth in N.Y. LEGis. LAW § 30 (McKinney 1952).
13. The mandatory reporting requirements for CUNY, SUNY, OMH, and OMRDD
are similar. The SUNY provision exemplifies each provision:
Within thirty days following the enactment of this appropriation, the Chancellor
of the State University and the director of the budget shall jointly submit to the
chairman of the senate finance committee and the chairman of the assembly ways
and means committee a plan which delineates those management steps which the
State University will initiate to achieve the staffing levels . . . consistent with
identified service needs. Said plan shall provide that the number of filled full-time
equivalent positions at the State University, excluding the State University hospitals, during the academic period July 1 -August 31, 1984, shall be between 26,449
and 27,221; and for the academic period September 1 - January 31, 1985 between
27,151 and 27,425; and for the academic period February 1 - June 30, 1985 between 27,244 and 27,519.
No later than thirty days following the close of each of the academic periods
specified above the director of the budget shall submit a report to the chairman of
the senate finance committee and the chairman of the assembly ways and means
committee identifying the actual number of filled full-time equivalent positions at
the State University, excluding the State University hospitals, for each payroll
period during such academic period. If for any payroll period during such academic period the actual number of filled full-time equivalent positions is less than
the minimum number specified herein, such report shall also identify for such
payroll periods (i) the magnitude of such differences, (ii) the reason for such variances, (iii) the programmatic impact of such variances, and (iv) the steps that will
be taken to achieve the staffing levels specified above and compliance with the
plan required above during the academic period then in progress.
The director of the budget shall provide seven days prior notification to the
chairman of the senate finance committee and the chairman of the assembly ways
and means committee of any proposed action which, in his judgment, could prevent the attainment of the filled position levels specified above and in the plan
required by this appropriation, and the circumstances and conditions to which
these actions relate. Nothing contained in his [sic] section is designed to alter the
respective constitutional responsibilities and powers of the executive and legislative branches of government.
State Operations, supra note 3, at 332-33.
14. N.Y. Times, Mar. 31, 1984, at 26, col. 1.
15. G. Benjamin, Cuomo Communicating 17 (unpublished paper) (copy available at
the Pace Law Review).
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Moreover, although the budgeting process was relatively
calm in regard to the appropriations themselves,"6 the debate
over the adoption of the mandatory staffing levels was quite
heated. There was concern that these provisions would limit the
exercise of executive discretion. 17 The reason for this debate and
for the ultimate inclusion of the mandatory staffing levels and
reporting requirements in the budget was legislative discontent
over executive impoundment" of certain appropriations for staff
from the 1983-1984 budget for CUNY, SUNY, OMH, and
OMRDD. Referring to these 1983-1984 impoundments, one committee chairman stated that the "Legislature fought to have
these monies restored. The money was there. It just did not happen."" 9 That "it did not happen," however, was not unusual.
Rather, it reflected an executive practice at least informally condoned until this time by legislative acquiescence. As correctly
stated by a spokesman for the Division of the Budget, "[the
1983-1984 impoundments are] part of what the state has done
and part of what the Legislature has watched happen for years.
We didn't pick on these agencies. We did what we always do."2
What was unusual was the legislative response to a previously
common executive practice.
One purpose of this Article is to study the 1983-1984 impoundments and the Legislature's response to them. The Article

16. The major substantive issues were the amount of aid to public education and tax
cuts. Although, the Republicans quickly passed their tax cut program in the Senate
where they were in the majority, they subsequently agreed to drop this issue during negotiations with the Assembly. All parties agreed that there should be a large increase in
education aid that was passed as part of the budget. See N.Y. Times, Mar. 31, 1983 at
26, col. 1.
17. See infra text accompanying notes 189-95.
18. Impoundment refers to the executive's withholding of appropriated funds. The
term is neutral; its -propriety depends on the legitimacy of the executive's
claim - whether it is statutory, directly constitutional, or inherently constitutional. As
Louis Fisher has written "[t]o say that 'impoundment has been used in the past' is to say
nothing at all. The proper inquiry must be 'what kind of impoundment?' It comes in
many shapes and colors, legitimate in one case and highly suspect in another." Fisher,
Impoundment of Funds: Uses and Abuses, 23 BUFFALO L. REV. 141, 142 (1972) (an enlightening study of impoundments, engendered by President Nixon's 1973 claim to the
inherent power to impound funds appropriated by Congress).
19. N.Y. Times, Dec. 29, 1983, at 26, col. 1 (quoting Sen. Frank Padavan, Chairman,
Advisory Committee on Mental Hygiene and Addiction Control).
20. N.Y. Times, Mar. 17, 1984, at B3, col. 4 (quoting Peter Lynch, Deputy Director
of the Division of the Budget). See also infra notes 157-60 and accompanying text.
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addresses impoundments from several perspectives. From a legal
perspective, it analyzes them within the framework of the constitutional and statutory provisions governing New York's
budget process and argues that the impoundments violated constitutional and statutory standards and that the legislative response was appropriate. From a political perspective, it places
the impoundments within the framework of the budget process
and the many understandings and agreements that underlie it.
This Article argues that despite past practices, these impoundments constituted an excessive aggregation of executive power
and that the legislative response appropriately corrected the
imbalance.
New York's budget system has for a long time served as a
model for the centralized, professional system believed to be
necessary to orderly budgeting and management of the large
sums necessarily expended by the modern state. The growth of
this system dominated by the Executive has triggered a dilatory
but corresponding growth in the talent and interest of the New
York Legislature for participating in this process. 2 1 The Legislature's assertion of its role is a central concern of this Article. As
described by the Speaker of the Assembly, Stanley Fink, 22 "[tihe
disputes over staffing . . result from a maturing process in the
Legislature, in which committee chairmen and their staffs are
becoming increasingly expert and want to make sure the laws
they passed are being implemented properly. '23 A further purpose of this Article is to provide a case study that might be of
value to other state legislatures that experience similar
problems, which are likely to be exacerbated by a growing na21. See NEW YORK STATE DIVISION OF THE BUDGET, THE EXECUTIVE BUDGET IN NEW
YORK STATE: A HALF-CENTURY PERSPECTIVE 144-48 (1981) [hereinafter cited as THE ExECUTIVE BUDGET]. This volume provides an excellent history of the New York State Division of the Budget. For an overall study of government budgeting, see J.
ERNMENT BUDGETING

BURKHEAD,

Gov-

(1956).

22. Assemblyman Fink, a Democrat, represents the 39th Assembly District and has
served as Speaker since 1979. A special tribute must be paid to Speaker Fink. Basically,
his determination to see that both houses of the legislature excercise their independent
legislative responsibilites has resulted in substantial change in legislative attitudes. This
is not to dismiss the significant contributions of the other leaders during this period: the
temporary President of the Senate, Warren M. Anderson; the Senate Minority Leader,
Manfred Ohrenstein; and the Assembly Minority Leader, Clarence D. Rappleya. I only
make a point with which I am sure they would all agree.
23. N.Y. Times, Mar. 18, 1984 at E6, col. 1.
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tional policy of decentralization and deregulation.
Since most state legislatures meet on a part-time basis and
are composed of part-time members,24 it is particularly difficult
for them to assume oversight responsibilities.2 5 Some recommendations on how to facilitate this task are also provided.
Finally, it is hoped that an exposition of the New York
budget process will be of general interest to the legal community, for whom this Article is written. It is often surprising how
little lawyers and law students, even those who participate in the
legislative process, know about the most significant of all governmental processes - that of making and implementing a budget.
II.

The New York State Budget Process

Since 1939, the executive branch has dominated the budget
in New York State. 2 This evolution came in response to the
chaotic growth of government-funded programs and their costs
in the early part of this century.2 7
Under the current process the Governor, through the Division of the Budget and its director,2 is responsible for the preparation, presentation, implementation, and management of the
budget, while the Legislature is responsible for its review, passage, and oversight. 29 The legislative role is basically reactive, al24. The New York State Legislature meets for approximately six months a year for
an average of three days a week. Although many members characterize themselves as
full-time, many still retain additional part-time jobs. See generally, THE NEW YORK RED
BooK (87th ed. 1983-1984) (yearly publication that lists the biographies of all the members of the New York State Legislature).
For a discussion on "part-time" legislators in New York, see The Knickerbocker
News (Albany), Dec. 5, 1984, at 1, col. 3. For a detailed study of other states, see generally THE COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, THE BOOK OF STATES 1984-85, at 79-141
(1984).
25. Oversight, as used in this Article, defines the responsibility of the legislature
with respect to the implementation of legislation to ensure that it has been designed
correctly to accomplish its purpose and that it is being administered properly by the
executive.
26. See generally THE EXECUTIVE BUDGET, supra note 14; N.Y. CONST. art. VII; N.Y.
STATE FIN. LAW §§ 20-53a (McKinney 1974 & Supp. 1983-1984).
27. See generally THE EXECuTIvE BUDGET supra note 21, at 1-75.
28. The Division of the Budget is charged with exercising the governor's powers
under article III of the State Finance Law. N.Y. STATE FIN. LAW § 20 (McKinney 1974).
For a discription of the Director's duties, see supra note 11.
29. Students of the federal budget process will find the New York system comparatively simple. However, the constitutional roles of the legislative and executive branches
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though there have been substantial fiscal and appropriation initiatives by the Legislature during the last several years.30
A.

Preparation

The budget process commences in the late summer of each
year when the Division of the Budget has discussions with the
various state agencies about their needs and plans for the following fiscal year."1 These discussions continue through December,
when the actual budget and its bills are prepared for submission
to the Legislature. During this preparation period, decisions are
made and strategies are developed on the revenue or expenditure initiatives that the Executive wishes to undertake in the
next fiscal year. Two sets of hearings are integral parts of this
preparation process. The first set, known as formal budget hearings, are required by the Constitution. 2 These hearings force the
state agencies to defend their budget proposals before the members and staffs of the legislative fiscal committees and the Division of the Budget. The second set, known as informal hearings,
are similar to the first but occur without legislative
participation.
In January or February, 33 the Governor submits to the Legare similiar in the federal and the state systems. For an excellent study of the Congress'
exercise of its oversight responsibility, see A. MAASS, CONGRESS AND THE COMMON GOOD
(1983). Maass characterizes the legislative process as a "Control" Function, which he
defines as exercising "a check upon executive leadership, to oversee it, to criticize and
influence it, and to approve, reject, or amend specific executive proposals." Id. at 11.
30. In 1981, for example, the legislature structured the authorization that enabled
the Metropolitan Transportation Authority to raise approximately $5 billion in capital
funds. It also constructed a tax package to subdsidize its operations. In addition, the
legislature has been responsible for increasing the funding for state universities, private
universities, and public schools, since at least 1981.
31. It can be argued that the budget process actually commences immediately after
the passage of a new budget, as agency heads allocate the appropriated funds in the
context of the needs of future years. According to the Constitution, the heads of each
department, if requested to, must furnish the governor and legislature with estimates of
their budget needs. N.Y. CONsT. art. VII, § 1. These estimates serve as a basis for the
discussions and hearings described in the text. This provision has significant historical
importance in the development of the executive budget because it terminated the prior
practice of allowing departments to deal directly with legislative committees. See THE
ExECUTIVE BUDGET, supra note 21.
32. N.Y. CONST. art. VII, § 1. See also, N.Y. STATE LEGIs. LAW § 32 (McKinney Supp.
1984-1985).
33. Constitutionally, the budget must be submitted to the legislature by the second
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islature the budget along with the required budget bills. These
bills include appropriation bills for state and federal funds 34 and
revenue bills or other legislation necessary to balance the
budget.3 5 The budget must contain all intended expenditures
and estimated revenues along with any recommended legislation. 6 For thirty days from the date of the budget's submission,
37
the Governor may, as of right, amend the budget and its bills.
The budget bills are subject to continuous amendment by the
Legislature or by the Governor with the Legislature's consent.38
The budget is required to be balanced on submission to the
Legislature but not upon passage or throughout the year. 9 Except for the legislative and judicial budgets, the budgets for all
the governmental departments are subject to extensive executive
review and alteration, prior to their approval for submission to
the Legislature. This is a significant aspect of the executive

Tuesday after the first day of the legislature (the first Wednesday after the first Monday
in January, N.Y. CONST. art. XIII, § 4), but in the year following the election of a governor, it must be submitted by February 1. N.Y. CONST. art. VII, § 2.
34. Over the last several years federal funds have constituted approximately 26% of
the state's revenues. In 1983-1984, the estimated revenue was $28.516 billion. $7.78 billion of this amount was expected from the federal government. Until 1981, those funds
were dispersed by administrative direction within existing federal guidelines that were
reasonably broad. In 1981, in response to a suit instituted by Senator Warren Anderson,
President Pro Tem of the New York State Senate and Majority Leader, the Court of
Appeals declared: "that the expenditure and payment of moneys received from the Federal Government . . . without an appropriation violated section 7 of Article VII of the
New York State Constitution." Anderson v. Regan, 53 N.Y. 2d 356, 368, 425 N.E.2d 792,
798, 442 N.Y.S.2d 404, 410 (1981). Section 7 of article VII provides in part: "[nmo money
shall ever be paid out of the state treasury or any of its funds or any of the funds under
its managment, except in pursuance of an appropriation by law." N.Y. CONST. art. VII, §
7.
35. N.Y. CONST. art. VII, §§ 2 & 3.
36. Id. § 2. By statute the budget must also contain extensive amounts of additional
information, including a five year capital plan, debated information about fund types,
and a five year financial plan. N.Y. STATE FIN. LAW § 22. (McKinney Supp. 1984-1985).
37. N.Y. CONST. art. VII, § 3.
38. Id. at §§ 3, 4.
39. N.Y. CONST. art. VII, § 2. For a discussion of this rule see supra notes 160-69 and
accompanying text.
In his 1984-1985 budget proposals, Governor Cuomo recommended a constitutional
amendment that would require the state to adopt a budget balanced according to generally accepted accounting principals (GAAP). GAAP would require the budget to be balanced on an accrual basis. N.Y. Times, Jan. 11, 1985, at B2, col. 1. At the time this
Article was written, this proposal was being opposed by the legislature because it is too
inflexible. Id..
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budget process because it ensures the maintenance of fiscal integrity and program consistency and because it permits the Governor to stamp a particular theme on his budget.4 0 The legislative and judicial budgets and their bills are prepared separately
by each branch of government and are presented to the Governor who must submit them without change to the Legislature as
part of his budget proposals. The Governor may, however, make
recommendations about them. 1
According to the New York State Constitution, the appropriations must be itemized: "[flor the Legislature to intelligently
fulfill its proper role, it is of course necessary that the budget be
itemized, lest the Legislature simply be presented with a lump
'4
sum which could be spent at the discretion of the Governor. 1
In practice, the appropriations are better characterized as lump
sums, divided by programs within agencies, and categories
within programs. An appropriation for a particular program will
generally not contain a listing for each of the program's staff positions or a reference to the number of positions for the program
or the agency. Instead, there will be an appropriation with a
general purpose, such as, "amount available for personal service."' 43 The schedules of positions that are the bases for these
appropriations are negotiated prior to arriving at the appropriation figure. These schedules represent an agreement between the
Executive and Legislature.4 4

40. In the view of one commentator:
The fundamental purpose of budgeting is, after all, to produce and execute a
coherent and workable plan from a myriad of conflicting possibilities, and although budget directors must learn to live with uncertainty it is their function
within an executive budget system to do what they can to reduce the number of
unknowns, to define the limits of resources, and to establish within the administration the agenda of economically feasible alternative courses of action to reach
agreed upon goals.
THE EXECUTIVE BUDGET, supra note 21, at 104.
Essentially there are four executive versions of an agency's budget: the Agency
Budget, the Division of the Budget's version of the agency's budget, the budget negotiated between the agency and the Division, and the budget with the governor's
imprimatur.
41. N.Y. CONST. art. VII, § 1.
42. E.g., Saxton v. Carey, 44 N.Y.2d 545, 549, 378 N.E.2d 95, 98 406 N.Y.S.2d 732,
734 (1978); People v. Tremaine, 281 N.Y. 1, 21 N.E.2d 891 (1939).
43. See, e.g., State Operations, supra note 3, at 25.
44. Agreements of this sort are significant to the impoundment dispute and are discussed in text accompanying notes 176-81.
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The form of appropriation bills has been the subject of considerable debate over the last sixty years. Both the Executive
and Legislature have viewed them as a vehicle for asserting more
control.4 5 Although some commentators have argued that this
debate was settled in the early 1970's,46 the 1984-1985 budget
emphasizes the continued attractiveness of using budget language as a device for legislative control.
B.

Legislative Review and Passage

The New York Legislature is a bicameral body containing a
Senate and an Assembly. Its constitutional officers are the Temporary President of the Senate and the Speaker of the Assembly, chosen respectively by the Senate and Assembly. Both
houses are organized by party conference, through which nominations for Speaker and Temporary President are made. The
nominees of the majority party will in almost all cases become
the Speaker of the Assembly and the Temporary President of
the Senate. During 1983 and 1984, the Republicans formed the
Senate majority conference and the Democrats formed the Assembly majority conference. The minority conferences also
choose their leaders who, together with the Speaker and Temporary President of the Senate, form the legislative leadership. In
New York these leaders dominate the Legislature through custom, rules, and strong central staffs. A leader can generally effectuate his will as long as he understands his conference's dynamics and the limits of their indulgence. The Speaker and
Temporary President select the majority members for the committees, and the minority members are chosen by the minority
leaders. The legislative leaders also determine, within their
budget, the amount of funding members will receive for their
staff. In addition, each conference has a central staff that is controlled by the conference leader and includes a counsel's office, a
program office, and a fiscal office.
Upon receipt by the Legislature, the budget and its bills are
referred to each house's respective fiscal committee and each
item of appropriation and revenue is reviewed.4 7 Budget hear-

45. See THE EXECUTIVE BUDGET, supra note 21, at 136-44.

46. Id.
47. See, e.g., N.Y. SENATE R. VI, § 6 (1983-1984), which requires both bills to be
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Appropriate members of each house are con-

sulted concerning the merits of various appropriations and requests for additional appropriations. Additionally, formal party
conferences are held to provide and receive information. This
process is of course more fluid than it sounds; it consists of hundreds of informal communications that occur among legislators,
staff members, lobbyists, constituents, executive staff members,
and representatives of state agencies, municipalities, and localities. The focus of these communications, however, is never on
more than a small percentage of estimated revenues or intended
expenditures.
The Legislature may not pass or consider any appropriation
bill of its own until it has acted upon the Governor's appropriation bills. 49 It may either pass or reject the appropriation bills. It

may also strike out or reduce an item of appropriation or add a
specific item on a separate line. The Constitution provides that,
other than to reduce, strike out, or add a separate item, "the
legislature may not alter an appropriation bill submitted by the
governor." 50 As a result of legislative attempts to restrict or condition the use of funds, the meaning of this constitutional provision has been subject to considerable dispute. This provision
played an important role in framing the 1984-1985 legislative response to the 1983-1984 impoundments. 1
referred to the Finance Committee. The fiscal committees are the legislature's most important committees. These committees have large staffs for both the majority and minority conferences. The committees are to a large extent "staff dominated." This is a result
of the complexity of the issues, the professional qualifications of the staff, and the fact
that they are employed full-time in a part-time legislature.
48. See N.Y. CONST. art. VII.
49. N.Y. CONsT. art. VII, § 5. An exception to this rule is upon a message of necessity
from the governor. Id.
50. N.Y. CONST. art. VII, § 4.
51. In 1982, for example, the legislature attempted to condition the expenditure of
certain appropriations for the Westway Highway Project by adding restrictive language
to the budget bills. These restrictive provisions were vetoed and not overridden. During
this process the Counsel to the Governor requested an opinion from the Attorney General of New York State on the constitutionality of these legislatively enacted restrictions.
Letter from John G. McGoldrick, Counsel to the Governor, to Robert Abrams, Attorney
General (Apr. 19, 1982) (copy available at the Pace Law Review).
The Attorney General concluded that the "Legislature by acting in the manner it
chose here, did not follow procedures for action on appropriation bills required by the
Constitution." Letter from Robert Abrams, Attorney General, to John McGoldrick,
Counsel to the Governor (Opinion No. 82-FS May 3, 1982). To reach this conclusion he
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Legislative participation in the budget process has traditionally focused on the expenditure side of the budget, while anticipated revenues have been left to the Executive. Over the last
several years, however, this has changed substantially. The Legislature has realized that the power to establish revenue levels
gives the executive branch a significant advantage in controlling
state policy. 2 Consequently, the Legislature has developed staff
competency in estimating revenues and a political determination
to make revenue estimates part of its budget negotiations." Al-

opined, "our conclusion is based primarily on the specific language of Article VII, § 4 and
the overall constitutional scheme for budget action. However, no New York cases dealing
with the distribution of power between process are squarely on point, and the issue is not
entirely free from doubt." Id. That doubt is the product of confusion over whether the
constitutional power to "strike out or reduce," N.Y. CONST. art. VII, § 4, an item of appropriation includes the power to restructure or to limit the expenditure of an appropriation or whether this legislative act constitutes an otherwise prohibited alteration.
My own view is that the Attorney General's opinion is incorrect. The essence of the
constitutional provision in question is to prohibit using the appropriation bills to effectuate policy other than that covered by the executive appropriations. Thus, in People v.
Tremaine, 252 N.Y. 27, 168 N.E. 817 (1929), the court stated that a rider conditioning
the executive's expenditure of an appropriation on the prior approval by the legislative
chain of the fiscal committees was a prohibited alteration.
Most restrictive language, however, relates directly to the use of an appropriation.
The Westway language, for example, conditioned its expenditure on the availability of
federal funds. Another example is the frequent use of restrictive language to eliminate
particular staff positions. See New York Public Interest Reseach Group, Inc. v. Carey, 55
A.D.2d 274, 390 N.Y.S.2d 236 (3d Dep't 1976), appeal dismissed, 41 N.Y.2d 1072, 364
N.E.2d 849, 396 N.Y.S.2d 183 (1977). This more enlightened position has been taken by
the Maryland courts in Bayne v. Secretary of State, 283 Md. 560, 392 A.2d 67 (1978),
with respect to a similar constitutional provision in which the court held:
The conditions here, however, reflect no attempt to establish policy by general
legislation. The General Assembly's authority to reduce or strike out an item of
appropriation necessarily includes the authority to condition or limit the use of
• . . the facility for which the money is appropriated, provided the condition of
limitation is directly related to the expenditure of the sum appropriated, does not,
in essence, amend either substantive legislation or administrative rules adopted
pursuant to legislative mandate, and is effective only during the fiscal year for
which the appropriation is made.
Id. at 574, 392 A.2d at 74.
52. See THE ExEcurivE BUDGET, supra note 21, at 145-47.
53. From an organizational perspective each of the legislative fiscal staffs have revenue units. Most of the disputes discussed, supra note 54, resulted from disagreements
over revenue projections. The legislature clearly demonstrated its determination with respect to its own revenue projections in the 1982-1983 budget when it overrode a variety.
of executive vetoes, claiming that funds were available to cover the expenditures. In addition, since the legislature makes its revenue prediction three months after the executive preditions, it can often take advantage of a built-in surplus that results from the
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though differences between executive and legislative revenue estimates may be small if considered as a percentage of most conservative revenue estimates, the dollar amounts are quite often
substantial. 4 Thus, higher revenue estimates involve powerful
support for increasing expenditures for favored programs, implementing new programs, or cutting taxes.5
Most of the disputes over revenues and expenditures are
eventually resolved at an executive-legislative staff level in consultation with interested legislative members. The remaining
disputes are turned over to the legislative leadership for resolution with the Governor. Usually these entail significant policy
disputes concerning, for example, revenue bills, major changes in
social policy, or significant increases in educational funding.
Sometimes, however, they may involve a small item wanted by a
determined legislator who has not been accommodated earlier in
the process. It is this last part of the budget process that commands public attention and is generally referred to as budget
negotiations. The sides in these disputes do not necessarily reflect party lines. Thus, in 1981, the Assembly passed a "Democratic" budget, supported by the Democrats in the Legislature
and the Governor, but in 1982, the Legislature passed a "legislative" budget, opposed by the Governor.5 Ultimately, agreements
are reached and most are reduced to bills and passed.
Other agreements remain "understandings" among the various parties. These may be agreements to expend lump sum appropriations in a particular fashion or not to expend appropriations until a further agreement is reached. 7 The understandings
also may include agreements that the cash value of a certain

Division of the Budget's traditionally conservative quarterly projections.
54. For example, in the 1984-1985 budget, the amount in dispute was approximately
$255 million, or .7% of the state budget. In 1983-1984, it was $50 million, or .2% of the
state budget. In 1982-1983, it was $200 million, or .7%.
55. The Republican desire for tax cuts and the Democratic desire for a dramatic
increase in aid to education were both proposed in the context that available future revenues would exceed the revenues projected by the executive. See supra note 16.
56. In 1981, the Democrats wanted the state to assume the local share of Medicaid
costs. This position was opposed by the Republicans. On May 12, the budget was passed
after all parties agreed to "table" the issue for another year. In 1982, after a dispute with
Governor Carey over available revenues, the legislature passed what it considered to be a
balanced budget that was basically sustained after a series of vetoes and overrides.
57. See infra notes 176-88 and accompanying text.
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item for a particular fiscal year is below the amount appropriated. This is known as the "cash" value of an item of appropri°ation. These negotiated understandings are considered binding
.on all of the parties to the budget and their breaches, although
not subject to court jurisdiction, are remedied in the legislativeexecutive arena. It is the perceived breach of such an agreement
that resulted in the Legislature's response to the 1983-1984
impoundments.59
For the last several years, each house of the Legislature, has
adopted, by resolution, a statement of legislative intent known
as The Report of the Fiscal Committees on the Executive
Budget.10 Essentially, the Report sets forth the Legislature's action on each of the Governor's items of appropriation with an
explanation of the action when the Committee deems necessary.
The Report may include a statement of projected revenues, depending on whether there is an accord on this projection. 6 ' Although the Report is the product of the Legislature alone, the
itemized expenditures from the Legislature's perspective reflect
a negotiated accord between the Legislature and the executive
branch. This is significant since the Report may be more specific
than the budget bills themselves, and thus, may represent a limitation on executive power over and above that contained in the
bills.
Just as with the understandings, failure to abide by the accords contained in the Report represents a breach of faith and is
subject to political remedy. From the perspective of statutory
construction, the New York State Court of Appeals has suggested that the Report is admissible when a budget bill is

58. Capital funds for a project, for example, are often appropriated in a total project
amount in one year with the knowledge that these amounts will be expended over several
years. The unspent portion must be reappropriated each fiscal year.
59. See infra text accompanying notes 189-95.
60. The Report of the Fiscal Committees on the Executive Budget is published each
year, jointly, by the legislative fiscal committees. In this Article, particular reference will
be made to NEW YORK STATE LEGISLATURE, REPORT OF THE FISCAL COMMITTEES ON THE
EXEcUTIVE BUDGET, APRIL 1, 1983 TO MARCH 31, 1984 [hereinafter cited as REPORT OF THE

FISCAL COMMITTEES 1983-1984].
61. There is no fiscal plan in the Report of the Fiscal Committees, 1983-1984, because the Senate Republicans projected revenues substantially in excess of those projected by the Assembly Democrats.
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ambiguous."2
Upon passage, the bills are returned to the Governor where
those requiring action are either signed or vetoed. 3 In New
York, the Governor has a "line item veto," which permits him to
strike certain appropriations while approving others. 4 This is a
powerful executive tool because it enables the Governor to restrain a legislative majority. Thus, a legislative addition, constitutionally required to be in the form of a separate item of appropriation, 5 can be struck without endangering the underlying
item or budget bills. This executive action may be reversed by
the Legislature through a two-third majority override. 6
C.

Implementation and Management

The Governor's responsibility to implement and manage the
budget has been delegated to the Division of the Budget. This
responsibility is a product of both state law and an executive
management arrangement that provides the Division and the
Governor the commanding control they have over the operation
of state government. The statutory source of this power is section 49 of the State Finance Law, 7 which prohibits expenditures
from any lump sum appropriations, except for the Legislature
and the judiciary, without the approval of the Director of the
Budget. One observer noted that, in regard to the Budget Director's power, "[t]his gives the budget office continuous control

62. See, e.g., New York Public Interest Research Group, Inc. v. Carey, 55 A.D.2d
274, 390 N.Y.S.2d 236 (3d Dep't 1976), appeal dismissed, 41 N.Y.2d 1072, 364 N.E.2d
849, 396 N.Y.S.2d 185 (1977). The court stated:
Regardless of standing, it is apparent that the complaint is without any legal
merit as was held by Special Term. . . . In the absence of some duly enacted
resolution of the Legislature there is nothing which would indicate any intent by
the members thereof that the Report is to be followed as a plan in reducing personnel. The recommendations of a Legislative committee do not necessarily represent the intent and purpose of the entire Legislature unless the contrary
clearly appears.
Id. at 276, 390 N.Y.S.2d at 237.
63. Under the New York Constitution only the appropriation bills for the legislature
and judiciary, and additions to the other appropriation bills need be signed by the Governor. N.Y. CONST. art. VII, § 4.
64. N.Y. CONST. art. IV, § 7.
65. N.Y. CONST. art. VII, § 4.
66. N.Y. CONST. art. IV, § 7.
67. N.Y. STATE FIN. LAW § 49 (McKinney Supp. 1984-1985).
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over the rate of obligations by departments, and extends to
budget execution the highly centralized pattern which characterized New York State budget preparation and submission."68
There are "master" certificates and "program" certificates.0 9
The master certificates reflect the Division's allocation of appropriated funds for all of an agency's programs. The program certificates reflect the Division's allocation for a specific program's
appropriation of the specific items that constitute the program.
No amendment to any lump sum appropriation can be made
without the Division's approval.70 To gain approval for the expenditure of appropriated funds, the agency must submit to the
Division a spending plan detailing by agency, program, and category its intended monthly expenditures.
The amount allocated in the master certificate and total of
the amounts allocated in the' program certificates should equal
both each other and the amount of the appropriation. Because
of the Division's power to transfer appropriations among an
agency's programs, however, the total amount that appears on
the program certificates may not equal the amounts appropriated for each program." The program and master certificates
should also reflect any exercise of the Division's authority to reduce appropriations if they are not needed due to changes in
circumstances. Spending plans submitted by the agencies, on
the other hand, need not reflect the actual amount of appropriation but rather the cash value assigned to any appropriations,
based on informal agreements reached prior to the budget's
passage.73
In addition to section 49, two other sections of the State
Finance Law are important for an understanding of the executive's power and responsibility for implementing the budget: sec-

68. J.

BURKHEAD, supra note 21, at 354.
69. Certificates of Approval are required pursuant to N.Y. STATE FIN. LAW § 49 (McKinney Supp. 1984-1985). Their form is determined by the Division of the Budget.
70. Id.
71. The Division's power to transfer funds pursuant to the N.Y. STATE FIN. LAW § 51
(McKinney Supp. 1984-1985), is discussed below. See infra text accompanying notes 76-

80.
72. The power to legally impound funds pursuant to the N.Y. STATE FIN. LAW § 42
(McKinney 1974), is discussed below. See infra text accompanying notes 78-80.
73. See supra notes 57-58 and accompanying text.
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tion 51"4 and section 42.75 Section 51 grants the Director of the
Budget total discretion to approve the transfer of funds among
items within an agency's program and limited discretion to approve a transfer between an agency's programs.76 The purpose of
this statute is to provide the Executive with the flexibility to
respond to a variety of unforeseen circumstances.7 7
Section 42 permits an expenditure of less than an amount
appropriated if the amount to be expended is "sufficient to accomplish in full the purposes designated by the appropriations.""8 The responsibility for making this determination is not
stated in section 42. In practice, the Division of the Budget has
served as its implementer, refusing from time to time to permit
the expenditure of funds when in its judgment the appropriation's purpose could be accomplished more economically. 79 The
authority to reduce expenditures for this purpose is an essential
management tool. Unfortunately, it has also been used to rationalize a determination on the part of the Division to reduce expenditures in response to what is perceived as prospective
budget deficits. Evidence of this practice is proffered by the Division's own official history:
The Division's response to the fiscal crisis beginning in 1968 was
to institute an expenditure control program. This, in itself, was
not unprecedented and rested on firmer statutory ground than
President Richard Nixon's roughly concurrent expedition into executive "impoundment." The State Finance Law (§ 42) and the
appropriation acts based upon it had long provided that appropriations were not commandments to spend but rather authorizations to be used only "as much as may be necessary" to achieve
the purposes set forth in the appropriation. 0
74. N.Y. STATE FIN. LAW § 51 (McKinney Supp. 1984-1985).
75. N.Y. STATE FIN. LAW § 42 (McKinney 1974).
76. N.Y. STATE FIN. LAW § 51 (McKinney Supp. 1984-1985).
77. See THE EXECUTIVE BUDGET, supra note 21, at 144. This explanation refers to
law in place in 1973. The law was tightened by amendment in 1981. See supra note 76.
78. N.Y. STATE FIN. LAW § 42 (McKinney 1974).
79. Competitive bidding on a contract, for example, can result in an actual need less
than the amount appropriated.
80. THE EXECUTIVE BUDGET, supra note 21, at 247 n.80. This statement is misleading. Although the State Finance Law does permit, if possible, spending less for the same
purpose, this was not the basis on which the control program noted was instituted.
Rather it was a product of executive-legislative agreement to permit the executive discretion in the face of fiscal difficulties.
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This statement suggests that executive impoundment of a
lawful appropriation is justified if done to avert a fiscal crisis.
From a constitutional and statutory perspective, this justification for executive impoundment has no basis in law.81 Indeed,
state impoundments for this reason are no different from similar
federal impoundments that have been condemned as unconstitutional.8 2 From a political perspective, however, executive impoundments in the implementation of the budget have rested on
"firmer ground" in the past. This is the result of the Legislature's historical failure to exercise its oversight responsibility on
a consistent basis and its reliance on the Executive's statement
of the nature and appropriateness of the Executive's own actions.8" In 1969, one legislative participant offered a comment
that remains relevant:
All too often, state legislatures are the weak links in the
American governmental process. Many state constitutions have
recently been modified to strengthen the executive branch. The
introduction of new budget systems and reorganization of the executive structure - to mention a few innovations - have all
added to the power of the Executive. State legislatures, on the
other hand, have often been sleeping giants - possessing an appropriate constitutional authority to balance that of the Execuin practice the full potentials of a power
tive, but not realizing
84
rightfully their own.
Despite the authority and responsibility the Legislature possesses to oversee the implementation of the budget, in New York
it has participated only in a limited reactive fashion, responding
on an ad hoc basis to isolated incidents. Whether the legislative

81. Oneida v. Berle, 49 N.Y.2d 515, 524, 404 N.E.2d 133, 138, 427 N.Y.S.2d 407, 412
(1980). In rejecting a similar argument, the New York Court of Appeals held that,
"under the State Constitution, the executive possesses no express or inherent
power - based upon its view of sound fiscal policy - to impound funds which have
[been] appropriated by the Legislature." Id. See infra notes 167-71 and accompanying
text.
82. See, e.g., Fisher, Impoundment of Funds: Uses and Abuses, 23 BUFFALO L. REV.
141 (1974).
83. See, e.g., THE EXECUTIVE BUDGET, supra note 21, at 147. See also id. at 248 n.90.
84. ROBERTS, CONCEPTS OF LEGISLATIVE FISCAL ANALYSIS AND REVIEW, REPORT TO THE
NEW YORK STATE ASSEMBLY WAYS AND MEANS COMMITTEE 2 (1969), reprinted in A.
HEVESI, LEGISLATIVE POLITICS IN NEW YORK STATE at 92-93 (1975). Mr. Roberts was formerly Secretary to the Assembly Ways and Means Committee.
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responses to the 1983-1984 impoundments will signify a more
continuous, formal approach to correcting the imbalance of
power that has existed between the legislature and the executive
branches of state governments remains to be seen.
III.
A.

The 1983-1984 New York State Budget

Preparation,Review, and Passage

On February 1, 1983, Governor Cuomo submitted his proposed 1983-1984 budget to the Legislature. Against the background of an executive-projected two-year revenue gap of $1.8
billion,"' the 1983-1984 proposal contained few additional expenditure initiatives. Instead, it focused on measures designed to
close the gap.8 6 The Governor stated: "[t]he simple truth is this:
an immense potential gap exists between our projected revenues
and expenditures. We have no alternative but to close that
gap."81 7 The Governor offered several proposals: a reduction in
the state work force,8 8 a reduction in appropriations for various
state operations and local assistance programs, 9 and increases
and adjustments in various fees and taxes."
The legislative reaction to the Governor's proposals was
unenthusiastic. While it was generally conceded that a gap ex85. See STATE OF NEW YORK EXECUTIVE BUDGET FOR THE FISCAL YEAR APRIL 1, 1983
TO MARCH 31, 1984 Governor's Budget Message, M18 [hereinafter cited as MESSAGE OF
According to the Governor, there would be a $579 million gap in the
1982-1983 fiscal year and a $1.3 billion gap in the 1983-1984 fiscal year. The legislature
correctly disputed the size of this gap. See NEW YORK STATE SENATE COMMITTEE ON FINANCE/MINORITY, CLOSE OF SFY 1982-1983 AND PROJECTIONS FOR SFY 1983-1984 (Mar.
10, 1983) (copy available at the Pace Law Review).
86. The Governor did call for a $1.25 billion infrastructure bond issue, which the
legislature approved and the voters ratified in November 1983. He also called for the
creation of a New York Water Finance Authority and a Regional Development Bank,
neither of which have received legislative approval to date. MESSAGE OF THE GOVERNOR,
supra note 85, at M13-M15, M27-M29.
87. Id. at M7.
88. Id. at M8-M9. These proposed reductions in the state workforce became known
as the Statewide Personnel Reduction Policy Program. See OFFICE OF EMPLOYEE RELATHE GOVERNOR].

TIONS, STATE OF NEW YORK, IMPLEMENTING THE STATEWIDE PERSONNEL REDUCTION PROGRAM

(copy available at the Pace Law Review) [hereinafter cited as IMPLEMENTING THE

PROGRAM]

89. MESSAGE OF THE GOVERNOR, supra note 85, at M9-M1O. For a discussion of these
reductions, see infra text accompanying notes 99-108.
90. MESSAGE OF THE GOVERNOR, supra note 85, at Mll. For a listing of these proposed increases, see id. at M19.
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isted which required additional taxes and some reductions in expenditures, questions were raised concerning the projected size
of the gap.91 Among the Democrats, particular concern was expressed over the reductions being proposed. The most controversial budget-cut was the proposed Statewide Personnel Reduction
Program, 2 which was designed to reduce the state work force by
14,000 jobs, thereby saving $219 million. 3 This proposed program had four components: early retirements, attrition, targeted
reductions, and layoffs. Layoffs constituted almost fifty percent
of the reductions. 4
With respect to the early retirement component of this program, which offered additional time credit for an earlier retirement, the Executive projected that it would result in a reduction
of 3400 employees, thereby saving approximately $54 million."
This saving was an approximate calculation since there was no
way to determine precisely the number of eligible employees
who would retire.9 6 Moreover, if the function of a particular retiree was in some way essential to the service being provided, or
if large numbers of employees retired from a particular agency,
various adjustments would be required that would reduce any
projected savings. In this respect, the impact of early retirements on the services, such as SUNY, OMH and OMRDD,97
which employed approximately thirty-eight percent of the eligible work force, was of particular concern to the Legislature. 8
Despite this uncertainty, it was clear by the end of the budget
negotiations that the amount of savings needed from the programs to balance the budget was $54 million. According to an
91. See

supra note 85.

MESSAGE OF THE GOVERNOR,

92. Id.
93. Id at M9.

94. See

IMPLEMENTING THE PROGRAM,

supra note 84, at 1-3.

95. For the anticipated number of early retirees, see id. at 1. For the estimated savings, see STATE OF NEW YORK, PRELIMINARY OFFICIAL STATEMENT: 1983 TAX AND REVENUE
ANTICIPATION NOTES 51 (Apr. 4, 1983) [hereinafter cited as 1983 PRELIMINARY OFFICIAL
STATEMENT].

96. For a discussion of the bill that passed, see infra 189-95 and accompanying text.
97. CUNY employees were not covered by the bill, nor were SUNY faculty

members.
98. See

OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER, REPORT ON THE RETIREMENT INCENTIVE PRO-

GRAM FOR NEW YORK STATE EMPLOYEES

10

(Dec. 30, 1984) [hereinafter cited as

COMP-

The total number of eligibles were 26,566 (2937 at SUNY, 4716 at
OMH, and 2577 at OMRDD).
TROLLERS REPORT].
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official state statement, "[t]he 1983-84 State Financial Plan assumes a saving of $54 million resulting from one component of
the workforce reduction program, the early retirement incentive
program pursuant to which 3,400 State employees who would
not normally have retired during fiscal 1983-84 are expected to
elect early retirement."9 9
In addition to reductions resulting from early retirements,
the proposed executive budget called for the reductions set forth
in the following table.
Table I
Job Reductions as a Result of Statewide Personnel Reduction
Program Proposed in the 1983-1984 Executive Budget,
Excluding Early Retirement
Agency
CUNY 10 0
SUNY 0 1

OMH 10 2
OMRDD10 3

Attrition" 4

Layoffs 10 5

Total

Savings
(millions)

227
630
342
96

554
1569
1388
747

781
2199
1730
843

$15.8
$37.1
$28.2
$12.8

The Legislature opposed these proposed personnel reductions on two grounds. First, under the leadership of the Speaker
of the Assembly, members of the Legislature argued that the
99. See 1983

PRELIMINARY OFFICIAL STATEMENT,

supra note 95, at 51.

100. STATE OF NEW YORK EXECUTIVE BUDGET FOR THE FISCAL YEAR APRIL 1, 1983 TO
MARCH 31, 1984, THE OPERATING BUDGETS 355 [hereinafter cited as OPERATING BUDGETS].

The budget contemplated an additional $5.8 million saving in the personnel service appropriation for CUNY, although not as part of the personnel reduction program. Id.
101. Id. at 236. An additional 498 jobs were scheduled for reduction under the prior
years targeted operating level. Id.
102. Id. at 138. Another 709 jobs were recommended for abolition in nondirect care

areas. Id.
103. Id. at 150. An additional 1,073 jobs were scheduled for reduction under an
agency reorganization plan.
104. According to the IMPLEMENTING THE PROGRAM, supra note 84, attrition was defined as the "planned control of vacancies projected to occur as a result of normal attrition during the 1983-1984 fiscal year." Id. at 1. It excluded direct care staff at OMH and
OMRDD and the hospitals operated by SUNY. Id.
105. Layoffs are defined as job abolishments with direct care staff at OMH and
OMRDD, and SUNY hospitals subject only to 50% of the "ratio applied to the remainder of the work force." Id. at 2-3.
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Personnel Reduction Program would substantially and adversely
affect significant state-funded services. Second, some legislators,
particularly some Senate Democrats, argued that the projected
savings that would be realized by the layoff component of the
Personnel Reduction Program were not substantial enough to
justify the disruption these layoffs would cause affected state
agencies.
In addition to the Personnel Reduction Program, the
budget also contained proposals for reductions in a variety of
local assistance programs. These reductions included the termination of a special municipal aid program,106 a deep cut in local
transportation support, 10 7 and cuts in a variety of other programs that had traditionally received strong legislative support.108 In addition, the Governor's proposed increase of $63 million in aid to public schools was generally considered to be too
low.
On March 1, 1983, after the negotiations and public discussions concerning his budgetary priorities began, the Governor
exercised his amendment right' 09 by reducing the proposed savings at CUNY from $15.8 million to $3.7 million and at SUNY
from $37 million to $27 million. This reduced the proposed layoffs at CUNY from five hundred fifty-four to forty-two. With
respect to SUNY, the amendment was silent as to the number
by which the proposed layoffs would be reduced.110
A series of negotiations occurred toward the end of March:
first among the Democratic legislative leaders, then among the
leaders and the Governor, and finally among the Republican legislative leaders. After these negotiations, an agreement was
reached with respect to the 1983-1984 appropriations. The relevant ingredients included the restoration of the remaining $3.7
million savings for CUNY, described in the law as "[a]dditional
funds to offset saving due to reduction in force and managed

106. MESSAGE OF THE GOVERNOR, supra note 85, at M21.
107. Id.
108. These included, for example, cuts in local aid to the arts, tourism, matching
grants, education programs, the Office of the Aging. Id. at A23.
109. N.Y. CONST. art. VII, § 3.
110. See AMENDMENTS TO STATE OF NEW YORK EXECUTIVE BUDGET FOR THE FIscAL
YEAR APRIL 1, 1983 TO MARCH 31, 1984, THE OPERATING BUDGETS 4 (copy available at the
Pace Law Review).
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attrition;"' the restoration of the remaining $27.1 million to
SUNY, plus an additional $2.4 million to "restore the statewide
personnel reduction lump sum and to preclude layoffs required
by base position reductions"; 2 the restoration of $22 million for
OMH "to offset savings attributable to the statewide personnel
reduction policy;"'1 3 and the restoration to OMRDD of "addi7
tional" staff totaling $18.8 million. Although the OMRDD bill
language did not expressly refer to the Statewide Personnel Program or Policy, it did contain, unlike the others, specific information about the positions the appropriations were intended to
restore. "
With respect to these items, the Report of the Fiscal Committees, 1983-1984,11 5 adopted with the budget on March 27,
1983,111 characterized the additional CUNY and SUNY funding

111. An Act in Relation to the Aid to Localities Budget, ch. 53, 1983 N.Y. Laws 662,
785.
112. An Act Making Appropriations for the Support of Government, State Operations Budget, ch. 50, 1983 N.Y. Laws 187, 491.
113. Id. at 382.
114. See id. at 399. It provided for $7.7 million "for services and expenses related to
530 additional institutioned client care and direct care support staff." Id. Another $8
million was similarly provided for additional community care patients. Id. at 406. An
additional $3 million was provided for additional restorations. Id. at 399, 406.
115. REPORT OF THE FISCAL COMMITTEES 1983-1984, supra note 60.
116. The resolution, which adopted the Report of the Fiscal Committee 1983-1984
as legislative intent states:
Whereas, Pursuant to Article 7 of the Constitution, the Governor submits to the
Legislature a budget containing a complete plan of expenditures to be made
before the close of the ensuing fiscal year; and
Whereas, Upon such submission, the Senate Finance Committee and the Assembly Ways and Means Committee begin an analysis and review of all the provisions of such budget; and
Whereas, After extensive study and deliberation, each committee makes recommendations as to the contents thereof; and
Whereas, Such recommendations are presented to the Members of the Legislature individually and collectively; and
Whereas, Each Member of the Legislature is given the opportunity to explain
and indicate his opinion on the proposed expenditures; and
Whereas, After such Members make their comments and suggestions, the
Senate Finance Committee and the Assembly Ways and Means Committee, representing the Members of each House, engage in negotiations designed to reach a
common accord on the contents of the Executive Budget; and
Whereas, After such accord is reached, a "Report of the Fiscal Committees on
the Executive Budget" is prepared, published and distributed; now, therefore, be
it
Resolved, That such report shall be deemed to be a statement by the Legisla-
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as increases to exempt these universities "from statewide personnel reduction policy and to stabilize the number of filled positions.' 1 7 The Report added that the "funds shall be used ' to8
prevent layoffs or equivalent savings from forced attrition.""
For OMH only $18.2 million of the restored funds were expressly identified as marked for the Statewide Personnel Reduction Program, "to provide full annual funding for 620 inpatient/
clinical, 175 inpatient/support and 458 outpatient staff scheduled for termination pursuant to the Statewide Personnel Reduction Policy in order to maintain current program levels.""1 9
The remaining $3.8 million was characterized as an increase for
positions "scheduled for termination" and included a listing of
the specific jobs for which the appropriations were made. 2 0 The
language of the Report relating to OMRDD, in contrast to the
provisions in the law, 2 ' referred to the increase of funds for the
"restoration" of specific staff but did not mention the Statewide
Personnel Reduction Program.' 2 2 With the restorations in place,
the agreed upon staffing levels for the four agencies were:
CUNY, 10,897; SUNY, 32,665; OMH, 37,436; and OMRDD,
27,635.
Table II sets forth these restorations. They do not correspond directly to the proposed job reductions set forth in Table
I. Instead, Table II reflects the product of a negotiation process
that focused on staffing levels for each of the four agencies, and
not necessarily on the job reduction classification contained in
Table I.

ture as to how expenditures should be made in the ensuing fiscal year; and be it
further
Resolved, That such report shall be and hereby is designated as the official
statement of legislative intent on the Executive Budget as submitted by the Governor and as amended by the Legislature.
Resolution of March 27, 1983, No. L 633, 1983 N.Y. LEGiS. REC. & INDEX 72.
117. REPORT OF THE FISCAL CoMMIrrEE 1983-1984, supra note 60, at 118, 137.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 77.
120. Of the remaining $3.8 million, $2.6 million was "to provide full annual funding
for 155 staff positions scheduled to be terminated to maintain current program levels."
Id. at 78. The remaining $1.6 million was "to provide the full annual funding for 65 staff
positions scheduled for termination at the Rockland Research Institute." Id. at 79.
121. See supra note 111.
122. REPORT OF THE FISCAL COMMITTEE 1983-1984, supra note 60, at 83-84. For the
language of the law, see supra, note 114.
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Table II
Job Restorations Negotiated as Part of the 1983-1984 Budget.
Agency
CUNY
SUNY
OMH
OMRDD

Positions Restored

Funding Received
(millions)

269
1919
1504
1022

$3.7
29.6
22.4
18.8

The restoration of these amounts in the face of the Executive's Statewide Personnel Reduction Program was considered
by the Legislature to be one of the significant accomplishments
of the budget negotiations. This sentiment was aptly described
by the Speaker of the Assembly in a letter to the Governor:
As you know, the Assembly's major concerns during last
year's Budget negotiations dealt with the delivery of essential services to at-risk populations served by OMH and OMRDD, and
the disruptive effects of hiring freezes and similar programs on
the delivery of pedagogical services at SUNY and CUNY. The negotiated budget agreement that was enacted into law last March,
addressed these concerns. 23
Despite considerable confusion over this point, the restorations
were not intended to exempt SUNY, OMH, and OMRDD from
the purview of the Early Retirement Program, which was enacted into law on March 28, 1983.24 Two related facts mandate
this conclusion: first, the amount of savings from the negotiated
Statewide Personnel Reduction Program included $54 million
for early retirements 2 5 and second, this savings could not be
reasonably realized if three agencies containing together thirty-

123. Letter from the Speaker of the New York State Assembly, Stanley Fink to the
Governor of New York, Mario M. Cuomo (Jan. 10, 1984) (copy available at the Pace Law
Review).
124. An Act Making Deficiency Appropriations for the Support of Government, ch.
5, 1983 N.Y. Laws 14.
125. IMPLEMENTING THE PROGRAM, supra note 88, at 1. If a number of employees
greater than 3400 retired as a result of the early retirement program, they were to be
part of the attrition program and thus subject to the restorations to the budget. See
supra notes 94-98 and accompanying text.
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eight per cent of the eligible workers were omitted.'2 6
Equally as clear is the agreement that once SUNY, OMH,
and OMRDD realized their intended savings by the early retirements of their shares of the 3400 employees, 2 7 their staffing
levels were to benefit from the restorations in the appropriation
bills. This interpretation of the limited applicability of the Early
Retirement Program on SUNY, OMH, and OMRDD is consistent with the language of the budget bills, restorations, and the
Report of the Fiscal Committees, all of which focused on the
layoff and attrition components of the Statewide Personnel Reduction Program. 2 '
Questions remained, however, about the impact of early retirement below 3400, on the direct care services provided by
SUNY, OMH and OMRDD. One legislative view was that an
agreement had been made with the Executive to fill direct care
staff losses from early retirement on a one-for-one basis.2 9 This,
it was argued, was to be paid for by an appropriation in the state
operations budget:
for supplementing appropriations available for personal service,
other than appropriations for the legislature or the judicial
branch, to all state departments and agencies in order to avert up
to two thousand layoffs required by the Statewide Personnel Reduction Program which shall be replaced, in whole or in part, by
savings from voluntary furloughs, attrition and the retirement incentive program, at the discretion of the governor.' 3
Although the language of this appropriation does not explic-

126. See COMPTROLLERS REPORT, supra note 98.
127. These shares were determined by multiplying the percentage of employees eligible for early retirement, for each of the three agencies, by 3400. The shares are: 374 for
SUNY, 603 for OHM, and 330 for OMRDD.
128. See supra text accompanying notes 115-20.
129. There is some confusion over this. My own recollection is that at a breakfast
among Democratic leaders and the Governor, which I attended along with other staff
members, the Director of the Budget assented to a proposal to refill those positions on a
one-for-one basis. However, at several later meetings, there was considerable discussion
about the impact of the early retirement program on these agencies, without reference to
any refill, at least below the pro rata share of the 3400. In retrospect, I think that the
agencies were to suffer early retirement losses of no greater than their share of the 3400
jobs and that any serious reduction in services would be accommodated by the $20 million appropriation. See infra notes 131-33.
130. OPERATIONS BUDGETS, supra note 100, at 366.
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itly state that reductions caused by the Early Retirement Program were to be restored by this $20 million, it was the recollection of the Speaker, the Chairman of the Ways and Means
Committee, and its staff, and several other legislative aides, who
had participated in the negotiations, that the inclusion of this
money in the budget was to restore at least some of the direct
care positions lost due to early retirements in SUNY, OMH, and
OMRDD.131 In this regard the Speaker wrote:
Further, it is my clear recollection, that we in the Assembly ultimately agreed to the enactment of the $20 million lump sum appropriation (a proposal which we had been skeptical of when it
was first proposed during negotiations) when the Director of the
Budget pointed out that the early retirement program was basically unmanageable and could effect the delivery of essential services to at-risk populations in unintended and undesirable
3 2
1

ways.

Ultimately, the affected agencies suffered reductions in direct
care staffing that the Executive did not restore by using the $20
million appropriation or otherwise. 3
With respect to the remaining reduction in local assistance
aid and the small increase in school aid, much of what had been
reduced was restored and school aid was increased to $143 million above the Governor's recommended increase.13 Legislative

131. For my own recollection, see supra note 129. The $20 million appropriation was
included in the budget "to ameliorate the unmanageable nature of the 'Early Retirement
Program"' at SUNY, CUNY, OMRDD, and OMH. N.Y. ST. ASSEMBLY WAYS & MEANS
COMM. REPORT, DOTrING THE I'S AND CROSSING THE T'S: RESTORING CHECKS AND BALANCES

3 (Jan. 1985) (copy available at Pace Law Review). Several
staff members who participated in the meeting confirm my view. Among them is Alden
B. Kaplan, Secretary to Senate Finance Committee, Minority. Mr. Kaplan stated that
despite the language of the appropriation its intent was to provide a cushion against the
direct care losses from the statewide personnel reduction program. Interview with Alden
B. Kaplan, November 19, 1984.
132. Letter from the Speaker, supra note 123.
133. Approximately two million dollars of the $20 million was expended. The remaining $18 million remained unallocated. None of the amount expended was used for
CUNY, SUNY, OMH, or OMRDD and almost none was used for direct care services.
Certification of Approval, Miscellaneous - All State Departments and Agencies (Mar.
19, 1984) (Dep't Code 2171, Program A8330010) (copy available at the Pace Law
Review).
134. For a full account of the restorations, see REPORT OF THE FIsCAL COMMITTEES,
1983-1984 supra note 60.
IN THE BUDGETARY PROCESS
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and executive additions to the original budget totalled approximately $393 million.13 5
To pay for these additional programs, the Governor and the
legislative leadership agreed to take a number of actions, including: adopting the Governor's tax package with some adjustments; a slightly upward revision of anticipated revenues including those projected from the new taxes;1 3 a re-estimation of the
costs of certain expenditures;"3 7 and, finally, a reduction of the
funding levels of certain programs.1 3 8 Moreover, because the Executive considered that these acts would not result in sufficient
revenue to compensate for the additional expenditures, it was
agreed, at least among the Democrats,13 9 that the Executive be
given some limited authority to further reduce expenditures if
necessary. This authority was not expressed in a statute, but remained a legislative-executive agreement. The existence,
amount, and terms of this reduction authority became an element in the impoundment dispute. The Executive contended it
had $50 million of unlimited authority. The Democrats in the
Legislature argued that the Executive had only $28 million of
authority, available only upon revenue deficits and the Republicans denied that the Executive had any authority at all.

135. As proposed, the budget projected total expenditures of $31.518 billion.
BUDGET 1983-1984, supra note 100. As passsed, projected expenditures were $31.999 bil-

lion. Of the $393 million restored, $294 million was considered cash for 1983-1984 fiscal
year.
136. The Governor's SFY 1983-1984 General Fund Tax Revenue Projection totalled
$18.806 billion and included a major sales tax base broadening proposal. BUDGET 19831984, supra note 100. The legislature rejected the sales tax proposal. This rejection reduced the projected tax revenue to $18.67 billion. After the budget was passed, the executive projected that the revenue for 1983-1984 would be $18.8 billion, which included $80
million from a new real estate gains tax, a $36 million upward re-estimation in revenues
from personal income taxes and a $56 million transfer from other funds. 1983 PRELIMINARY OFFICIAL STATEMENT, supra note 95, at B-2.
137. The proposed appropriation for general state charges, which includes among
other things, fringe benefits, was $1.408 billion. It was re-estimated at $1.39 billion. Id. I
also recall that the project cost of gas for the state's automobiles was reduced.
138. See generally REPORT OF THE FISCAL COMMITTEES 1983-1984, supra note 60.
139. In an interview with a New York Times reporter, Eugene K. Tykinski, Secretary to Senate Finance Committee, stated that he recalled no such agreements. N.Y.
Times, Dec. 29, 1983 at B3, col. 5.
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Implementation and Management

On August 11, 1983, the Deputy Director of the Budget sent
CUNY, SUNY, OMH, and OMRDD letters containing their Division of the Budget approved expenditure limits and personnel
targets for 1983-1984." ° These letters were the culmination of
several months of negotiation with the affected agencies. Essentially, the limits and targets reflected adjustments of proposed
agency spending plans and required the agencies to modify their
spending plans to conform with the letters' terms for the issuance of certificates of approval. A letter sent to OMRDD provides an example: "[algency fiscal and personnel plans must be
submitted to the Division of the Budget no later than August 26,
1983. The personnel plan must include a detailed layoff analysis.
The freeze on hiring will be lifted upon approval of these
plans.""4
Most significant, each letter required that the agency personnel target be below the staffing levels anticipated by the appropriation laws and underlying agreements. Thus, with respect
to the CUNY, a letter stated:
As we have noted, your personnel ceiling has been set at 10,547
positions, or 350 below the total funded in the Budget. That
limit, which must be achieved by June 30, 1984, is projected to
yield savings of $2.2 million and that sum will be unallocated on
the next regular certificate. 4"
As for the remaining agencies, the personnel target for SUNY
was set at 31,665, or 1000 positions below the agreed upon staffing level; 1 3 for OMH at 36,073, or 1363 positions below the
agreed upon staffing level; 144 and for OMRDD at 27,100, or 535
4 5
positions below the agreed upon staffing level.
140. Letter from Susan Tyler, Deputy Director of the Budget, to Dr. Joseph S. Murphy, Chancellor CUNY (Aug. 11, 1983); Letter from Tyler to Clifton R. Wharton, Chancellor, SUNY (Aug. 11, 1983); Letter from Tyler to Mr. William Morris, Acting Commissioner, OMH (Aug. 11, 1983); Letter from Tyler to Arthur Y. Webb, Acting
Commissioner, OMRDD (Aug. 11, 1983) (copies of each letter is available in the Pace
Law Review).
141. Letter from Tyler to Webb, supra note 140.
142. Letter from Tyler to Murphy, supra note 140.
143. Letter from Tyler to Wharton, supra note 140.
144. Letter from Tyler to Morris, supra note 140.
145. Letter from Tyler to Webb, supra note 140.

1985]

IMPOUNDMENT DISPUTE

Allowing for pro rata reduction from early retirement without concern for any restoration agreement with respect to
SUNY, OMRDD, and OMH, 46 the permissible reduction below
the staffing levels agreed upon would have been 374 at SUNY,
603 at OMH, and 330 at OMRDD.' 47 Taking these reductions
into account, the Division of the Budget's target levels were below the agreed upon levels by 626 at SUNY, 760 at OMH, and
205 at OMRDD. The reductions at OMH were aggravated by the
continuation of a hiring freeze, commenced in September of
1982, running through August of 1983. This hiring freeze reduced OMH's authorized staffing level to 2000 below the agreed
upon figure. Tables III and IV analyze these situations.
Table III
The Differences Between the Staffing Levels Agreed to by the
Legislature and the Executive's Target Staffing Levels
Agency
CUNY
SUNY
OMH
OMRDD

Agreed to
Staffing Level

Executive's
Target Level

Difference

10,897
32,665
37,436
27,635

10,547
31,665
36,073
27,100

350
1,000
1,363
535

Table IV
The Difference Between the Staffing Levels Agreed to by the
Legislature and the Executive's Target Staffing Levels, Allowing
for a Pro Rata Reduction from the Early Retirement Program
Agency
CUNY
SUNY
OMH
OMRDD

Difference

Pro Rata Early
Retirement

Difference

350
1,000
1,363
535

374
603
330

350
626
760
205

146. See supra notes 111-22 and accompanying text.
147. See supra note 127.
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The Impoundment Dispute

Members of the Legislature first became aware of a reduced
staffing level problem in May, 1983 when several legislators, concerned about complaints of reduced outpatient staffing at an
OMH facility, were informed that the reductions were a result of
the Statewide Personnel Reduction Program. One OMH official
wrote:
Among the various personnel reduction programs which were in
place, the Office of Mental Health lost a total of 2,700 employees,
1,800 to early retirement and 900 to layoffs and reduced authorization. .

.

. As you also know, the Office was recently authorized

to hire approximately 1,100 individuals, 500 of which were to offset early retirement and 600 of which were to backfill jobs which
had become vacant during normal attrition."'
In December, 1983, however, the issue began to take on institutional overtones. At that point, after receiving numerous
complaints from members of the Legislature and affected interest groups and as the result of hearings by joint legislative committee, 1 9 the Speaker of the Assembly directed the Secretary of
the Ways and Means Committee 150 to review the implementations of the budgets of SUNY, CUNY, OMH, and OMRDD. The
Secretary's Report submitted to the Speaker on January -10,
1984, concluded:
1. the position reduction targets that have been established administratively for SUNY and CUNY are contrary to the budget
agreement reached last March and embodied in the State Operations and Aid to Localities Budget Bills, the Report of the Fiscal
Committees on those bills, and the intent of the parties, legislative and executive, who negotiated that agreement;

148. Letter from John Urban, Deputy Commissioner of OMH to Barry Gershon,
Analyst, Senate Finance Committee (May 31, 1983) (copy available at the Pace Law
Review).
149. The joint legislative hearings were held by the Assembly Committee on Mental
Health, Mental Retardation/Development Disabilities, Alcoholism and Substance Abuse
of the Senate Mental Health Hygiene and Addiction Control Committee. These hearings
were held on December 29, 1983, at the Manhattan Psychiatric Center, January 25, 1984,
at the Bronx Psychiatric Center, and March 16, 1984, at the Rome Psychiatric Center.
See generally N.Y. Times, Dec. 29, 1983, at B3, col. 5.
150. The secretaries of the Assembly Ways & Means Committee and Senate Finance
Committee are statutory positions. N.Y. LEGIS. LAW § 27 (McKinney 1952).
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2. the effect of the early retirement program and the continuation
of the hiring freeze begun in September 1982, caused direct care
staffing levels at OMH and OMR/DD to reach unacceptably low
levels during the summer and fall of 1983. Refilling of these direct
care positions has begun, but staffing is still well below both the
staffing level agreed to in the 1983-1984 budget agreement and
the lower staffing level imposed administratively in the summer
of 1983.51

On the same day, the Secretary's Report was forwarded to
the Governor by the Speaker with the following requests:
(1) That the unauthorized position ceilings established for SUNY
and CUNY be immediately removed and the positions filled.
(2) That inasmuch as the unexpectedly high level of early retirements coupled with the unnecessary continuation of the hiring
freeze until September 1983 caused staffing levels at OMH and
OMRDD to reach disastrously low levels during the summer and
fall of 1983, we insure that the rehiring process be accelerated so
that the agreed upon staffing levels can be reached. 2
This submission to the Governor was followed by a series of
meetings between representatives of the Speaker and representatives of the Governor, over the weekend of January 14 and' 15,
1984. During these meetings, the Governor's representatives denied that the Executive had violated any agreements with the
Legislature, but offered to accelerate the implementation of
staffing increases intended for the 1984-1985 budget. In particular, the Executive proposed to hire sixty-nine members for
CUNY, ninety for SUNY, and a combination of three hundred
1 53
sixty for OMH and OMRDD.
The Legislature considered this proposal to be inadequate.
It declared that the issue would be considered as part of the negotiations for the 1984-1985 budget and for deficiency appropriations in 1983-1984, which covered unforeseen expenditures. In
late February, 1984, the Legislature passed a deficiency appropriation bill that was signed by the Governor on March 12,

151. Memo on the Implementation of the 1983-1984 State Budget, from Frank
Mauro to Speaker Fink (Jan. 10, 1983).
152. Letter from the Speaker, supra note 123.
153. N.Y. Times, Jan. 17, 1984, at B5, col. 2.
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1984. MT' Included within this bill were appropriations for CUNY,
SUNY, OMH, and OMRDD, similar in purpose to those restored in the 1983-1984 budget but which contained the specific
staffing levels to which the appropriations were related.1 55 In addition, the bill required that if the staffing levels fell below the
specified numbers, the Executive had to justify the reduction.
The language from the SUNY appropriation exemplifies the
provision:
Additional funds are provided to restore the state-wide personnel
reduction lump sum and to preclude layoffs required by base position reductions. (a) This increased funding is provided to exempt the State University from the state-wide personnel reduction policy and to stabilize the number of authorized filled
positions at 32,665. These funds shall be used to preclude the
need to secure savings from a reduction in staffing below such
level. (b) To the extent that the number of filled positions is reduced below the level specified in subparagraph (a) above as a
result of the retirement incentive program authorized by chapter
17 of the laws of 1983, the Governor or his designee shall (i) determine the number of positions vacated as the result of such program which should be refilled in order to assure the continuity
and quality of pedagogical, maintenance and student support services and of such other services as the Governor or his designee
determines to be appropriate, and (ii) authorize the refilling of as
many of such determined number of positions as he determines to
be feasible. (c) To the extent that the authorized year-end filled
position level as of March first, nineteen hundred eighty-four is
different from the level specified in subparagraph (a) above, the
director of the budget shall submit to the legislature by March
fifteenth, nineteen hundred eighty-four a report including: (i) the
year-end filled position level for the state university; (ii) and explanation of the reasons why such year-end filled position level is
different from that specified in subparagraph (a) above, and (iii)
and evaluation of the programmatic impact that such year-end
filled position level will have on the operations of the State
University.'56

The Executive responded to the mandatory staffing levels
154. An Act Making Deficiency Appropriations for the Support of Government, ch.
5 (Jan. 21, 1984) (copy available at the Pace Law Review).
155. See id at 26, 15, 9.
156. Id. at 15.
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and reporting requirements on March 15, 1984, in his Report to
the Legislature on Staffing Levels.1 57 This Report concluded that
the staffing levels then applicable to CUNY, OMH, and
OMRDD resulted from both the impact of early retirement and
management action taken to balance the financial plan. 58 The
Report's analysis of all executive action taken for fiscal 1983 "indicates that the Executive fulfilled his responsibility to the purchasers of State notes to manage deficits while fully supporting
the intent of the Legislature.'""9
Thus, the Executive's justification for reducing staff levels
below what the Legislature appropriated centered upon the Governor's obligation to the State's lenders. The source of this
power to impound funds was described in the Report to the Legislature on Staffing Levels as follows:
The Governor is required by the Constitution to submit a
balanced budget to the Legislature for its consideration. Although
neither the Constitution nor statute requires the Legislature to
pass a balanced budget, judicial decisions focusing on short-term
borrowing within a fiscal year have nevertheless established the
bedrock assumption that in both its enactment and execution the
budget will remain in balance. As a case in point, this determination precludes the State from undertaking such intra-fiscal year
borrowing unless the financial plan resulting from the enacted
budget is certified to be in balance. And, inherent in the State's
obligation to the individuals who purchase the tax and revenue
anticipation notes is the responsibility of the Executive to exercise management control over the budget during the execution
phase. This responsibility is clearly set forth in the certifications
provided to the noteholders testifying to both the fiscal balance of
the budget and the willingness of the Executive to maintain such
balance by exercising whatever management controls are available to him.
The validity of the tax and revenue anticipation notes rests
in part, therefore, on the availability of management controls and
on the ability of the State to maintain balance .

...

The ability of the Executive to manage and adjust the plan
157. REPORT TO THE LEGISLATURE ON STAFFING LEVELS AT OMH, OMRDD, SUNY,
CUNY (Mar. 15, 1984) (copy available at the Pace Law Review) [hereinafter cited as
REPORT TO THE LEGISLATURE].

158. Id. at 6.
159. Id.
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to reflect actual experience throughout the year is therefore far
from arbitrary; it is, indeed, fundamental to the Governor's constitutional responsibility to manage the day-to-day operation of
government. 16 0
This argument is flawed. Although it properly admits that
there is no constitutional or statutory requirement that the Legislature must pass a balanced budget, it nevertheless appears to
rest on a constitutional mandate for the Governor to maintain a
balanced budget. This mandate was said to arise from judicial
decisions relating to the issuance of state revenue and bond anticipation notes. Case law did not support this claim.
The only case reference even remotely supporting this proposition is dictum in Wien v. State of New York, 1" a case dealing with the state's authority to borrow short-term money to
loan to other governmental entities. According to the court:
There is no express treatment in the Constitution governing
appropriations made after the regular session and during the fiscal year at extraordinary sessions, but the implication is, and an
essential one, that additional appropriations must be covered by
matching revenues, or else the balanced budget of the regular session would be a device easily evaded at a later extraordinary session. A control on such evasion, however, and reinforcing the implication are the constitutional limitations on short-term
borrowing." 2
It is clear that neither this statement nor the case itself, authorizes the Governor to maintain a balanced budget by impounding appropriated funds. Although this passage, taken out
1 63
of context, may suggest a requirement for a balanced budget,
the entire case does not support this proposition. Moreover, the
proposition that the Governor has the power to impound funds
to maintain a balanced budget has been expressly denied by two
6 5 Wein
subsequent cases: Wein v. Carey""and Oneida v. Berle."
v. Carey, decided one year after Wein v. State of New York,

160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.

Id. at 1 (emphasis added).
39 N.Y.2d 136, 347 N.E.2d 586, 383 N.Y.S.2d 225 (1976).
Id. at 141, 347 N.E.2d at 588, 383 N.Y.S.2d at 227.
Id. at 148, 347 N.E.2d at 592, 383 N.Y.S.2d at 231.
41 N.Y.2d 498, 362 N.E.2d 587, 393 N.Y.S.2d 955 (1977).
49 N.Y.2d 515, 404 N.E.2d 133, 427 N.Y.S.2d 407 (1980).
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-dealt with a taxpayer's challenge to the issuance by the state of
revenue anticipation notes. The taxpayer claimed that these anticipation notes were invalid because the state budget was not
balanced at the time the notes were issued. In rendering its decision the court clearly stated that there was no constitutional
mandate to maintain a balanced budget:
The fact is that there may be an indefinite series of deficits
honestly suffered. All that is necessary to produce the result are
successive years of unpredictable shortfalls in revenues or rises in
required spending beyond estimates. Depressed economic conditions can affect both sides of the balance. Catastrophies, emergencies, or, in smaller scale, significant needs may arise, which, if unanticipated, may upset the balance on one side or the other.
Indeed, it is unattainable for any budget plan, perfectly and honestly balanced in advance, to remain in balance to the end of the
fiscal year. There must, as a practical matter, in every year be
either a deficit or a surplus. Nothing in the Wein case . . . suggests otherwise.
It is only when the estimates are dishonest that fault may be
found with the budget plan or that which is done pursuant to it.
It is then that the use of anticipation notes to balance the imbalanced budget plan is an unconstitutional practice. 6
Any remaining doubt concerning a constitutional obligation to
maintain a balanced budget and the Governor's authority to imto effect a balanced budget was dispound lawful appropriations
1 7
1
Berle.
v.
Oneida
in
missed
Oneida concerned the executive budget for 1976-1977. In
his budget, the Governor had recommended a $12 million appropriation for the maintenance and operation of sewage treatment
plants. The Legislature amended his proposal by adding $14
million to the program. The bill was signed by the Governor.
Subsequently, the Director of the Budget impounded $7 million
of this amount, explaining by letter that "his action in this matter is one instance of a necessarily comprehensive effort to
tighten State spending."1 As a basis for his authority, the Director offered the "dual justification . . . that the Governor, as

166. Wein v. Carey, 41 N.Y.2d at 504, 362 N.E.2d at 591, 393 N.Y.S.2d at 959.
167. 49 N.Y.2d 515, 404 N.E.2d 133, 427 N.Y.S.2d 407 (1980).
168. Id. at 520, 404 N.E.2d at 136, 427 N.Y.S.2d at 410.
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Chief Executive Officer of the State, has an obligation to maintain a balanced budget throughout the fiscal year and, to accomplish that goal, possesses implied constitutional power to reduce
duly enacted appropriations." ' 9 The court disposed of the Executive's argument simply by denying the validity of its premise:
the constitutional requirement that a balanced budget be maintained. The court stated:
It is true, as respondents maintain, that opinions of this court
have recognized the Governor's constitutional obligation to propose a balanced budget. .

.

. But at no time has the court sug-

gested that, once a budget plan is enacted, revenues and expenditures must match throughout the fiscal year. At any isolated
point in time in the spending year, there must, as a practical matter, be some gap between the two. Recognizing this reality, the
court has but recently disclaimed any obligation on the part of
the State to maintain a balanced budget. "[I]t is unattainable for
any budget plan, perfectly and honestly balanced in advance, to
remain in balance to the end of the fiscal year. There must. . . in
every year be either a deficit or a surplus." . . . Thus, respon-

dent's premise is untenable.
Given the absence of an obligation to maintain a balanced
budget, the constitutional argument falters. For if the executive
branch is under no duty to reduce expenditures or raise revenues
in order to retain an equilibrium as the year progresses, it can
hardly possess implied power unilaterally to "reduce" a lawful
appropriation.

70

According to the court, no other conclusion could be reached
under the provisions and doctrines of the New York State
Constitution:
A duly enacted statute, "once passed, cannot be changed or
varied according to the whim or caprice of any officer, board or
individual. It remains fixed until repealed or amended by the
Legislature." . . . Simply, the laws and policies of the State are

established by the lawmaking powers, not by "officers acting
solely on their own ideas of sound public policy, however excellent such ideas may be." . . . Once the appropriation was ap-

proved, therefore, the Governor and his subordinates were duty
169. Id. at 521, 404 N.E.2d at 136, 427 N.Y.S.2d at 410.
170. Id. at 521, 404 N.E.2d at 136, 427 N.Y.S.2d at 410-11 (quoting Wein v. Carey,

41 N.Y.2d at 504, 362 N.E.2d at 591, 393 N.Y.S.2d at 959).
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bound "to take care that [it was] faithfully executed." . . .
However laudable its goals, the executive branch may not
override enactments which have emerged from the lawmaking

process.1'
This view is entirely consistent with the many federal court
cases that held federal impoundments unconstitutional. 7
Since the Executive was without constitutional justification
for its actions, the propriety of these actions must depend upon
the existence of statutory or legislative authorization. From a
statutory perspective, the appropriation bills themselves contained no authority for the impoundment of appropriations except in the first section of each bill in which reference was made
to the impoundment power contained in section 42 of the Finance Law.' 73 Since the language in each of the budget appropriation bills is identical, the following excerpt from the State Operations Bill will serve as an example: "the several amounts
named in this section, or so much thereof as shall be sufficient to
accomplish the purposes designated by the appropriations, are
hereby appropriated and authorized to be paid ..

"174

With

respect to this provision and to section 42, no justification of the
impoundment was ever offered.1 75 Consequently, the validity of

171. Id. at 523, 404 N.E.2d at 137, 427 N.Y.S.2d at 411-12 (quoting Schumer v. Caplin,
241 N.Y. 346, 351, 150 N.E. 139, 140 (1925), Picone v. Commissioner of Licenses, 241
N.Y. 157, 162, 149 N.E. 336, 338 (1925), and N.Y. CONST. ART. IV, § 3). It has been suggested that the impoundments herein are different than those in Oneida because most of
the items impounded here are from the "State Purposes" budget and not "Aid to Localities." There is no support for this argument. Neither the Constitution nor any statute
notes such a distinction nor is there any logic to one. In fact, the categories of the appropriation bills are a product of executive choice and customs. See supra note 3.
172. See, e.g., United States v. Louisville, 169 U.S. 249 (1898); United States v.
Price, 116 U.S. 43 (1885); Kendal v. United States ex. rel. Stokes, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 524
(1838).
173. N.Y. STATE FIN. LAW § 42 (McKinney 1974).
It was claimed in Oneida that the appropriation bill, which was somewhat more
supportive of executive authority than the language of § 42, authorized the impoundments. The court dismissed this claim, stating "[sluch a legislative delegation would be
drastic indeed, and may not be inferred from ambiguous language." Id. at 564, 404
N.E.2d at 138, 427 N.Y.S.2d at 412.
174. STATE OPERATIONS BUDGET 1983, supra note 127. The language of § 42 differs
from this language because it includes the phrase "in full" after the word "accomplish." I
have unsuccessfully searched for a reason for this discrepancy but have found none.
Hopefully it will be corrected in the 1985-1986 budget.
175. Since § 42 of the State Finance Law provides for lawful impoundment, the
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the 1983-1984 executive impoundment had to rest on legislative1 76
executive agreements.
The executive branch claimed that two agreements justified
the challenged impoundments. The first was the dispute in
which the Executive claimed there had been an agreement for
unlimited executive authority amounting to $50 million, while
the Democrats contended there had been an agreement for limited executive authority, while the Republicans denied that
there had been any agreement. 177 The Executive maintained this
position in the Report to the Legislature, which stated: "As the
1983-84 budget negotiations proceeded, agreement was reached
on legislative changes to the Executive Budget. It was also assumed that the plan could be balanced, even though an appar17
ent $50 million gap remained after the agreement.'
The second agreement, which relates to a document knows
as a "Wein Statement," was tangentially referred to in the Report to the Legislature and was specifically referred to in a letter from the Director of the Budget to the Assistant Speaker of
the Assembly.' 79 The Wein Statement is a letter from each of
the legislative leaders to the New York State Comptroller after
passage of the budget.'
It certifies that the budget is balanced
on a cash basis, "assuming utilization of available funds and the
adoption and maintenance of available expenditure control
mechanisms by the executive.''8 According to the Director of
the Budget's letter: "[a] general understanding existed that
modest expenditure controls would be imposed to achieve that
budget balance. That understanding was not informal but was
written into documents [namely, the Wein Statement] jointly

executive could have utilized this section more effectively to support its position.
176. See supra text accompanying notes 57-73.
177. See supra text accompanying notes 138-39.
178. REPORT TO THE LEGISLATURE, supra note 157, at 2.
179. Letter from Michael Finnerty to Assemblyman Edward Griffith (Feb. 17, 1984)
(copy available at the Pace Law Review)
180. Letter from Senator Manfred Ohrenstein, Senate Minority Leader, to Edward
V. Regan, State Comptroller (Apr. 14, 1983) (copy available at the Pace Law Review).
This letter is known as the "Wein Statement" because its origins are in the two Wein
cases. See supra notes 161-64. Use of the Wein Statement was discontinued as a consequence of the impoundment disputes. See infra text accompanying note 190.
181. Id.
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certified, which were issued to the investment community."'8 2
The Legislature did not consider that either of these "agreements" were justifications for the disputed impoundments. With
respect to the first agreement, the purported "$50 million"
agreement,183 the Republicans did not accept even the existence
of an agreement, while the Democrats did not believe that more
than $28 million of discretionary funds had been allocated, and
then only to make up for a revenue deficit. 184 With respect to
this point, not only were there no deficits, but taxes and miscellaneous receipts for the 1983-1984 year were $54 million above
the initial financial plan projections.18 5 In addition, it was the
view of the Democrats that, to the extent that this discretionary
authority could be exercised, it could not be exercised against
CUNY, SUNY, OMH, and OMRDD. 186 Basically, the legislative
leaders considered the Wein Statements to be affirmations of the
already existing authority of the Executive to do what it was
lawfully permitted to do or what they agreed it could do. Thus,
in neither case would the Wein Statements support the
impoundments.
Moreover, by the time the Report to the Legislature on
Staffing Levels was issued - three months after the Speaker's
letter to the Governor

87

and nine months after the Legislature

first learned of the impoundment problem - the impoundment
issue had become an institutional challenge to the Legislature. It
was no longer possible to resolve the matter informally. The
length of time that had gone by, the inadequacy of the Executive's settlement offer, the breaches in informal agreements, and
the continued insistence by the Executive that nothing was
wrong, made an informal settlement impossible. Instead, the arguments in the Report to the Legislature on Staffing Levels
served only to exacerbate existing tensions and to ensure that
182.
183.
184.
185.

Letter from Michael Finnerty, supra note 180.
See supra text accompanying note 177.
See supra notes 138-39 & 177 and accompanying text.
The revenue projected in the initial financial plan was $18.654 billion. 1983
PRELIMINARY OFFICIAL STATEMENT, supra note 95, at 132. The 1983 mid-year report indicated $18.9 billion in projected revenue. STATE OF NEW YORK, BUDGET SUMMARY 4 (Oct.
1983).
186. See supra notes 127-32 and accompanying text.
187. See supra note 132.
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the Speaker's earlier admonition - "we are going to dot every i
and cross every t" ' 88 - would be realized.
D. Legislative Response to the Impoundments
The obvious means chosen to prevent future impoundments
was to reduce the number of agreements upon which the budget
was based by their components in the budget bills passed by the
Legislature. Thus, the inclusion in the 1984-1985 budget of the
mandatory staffing levels and reporting requirements was a natural and appropriate conclusion to the impoundment disputes.
The staffing level mandate made clear the job fill levels associated with the appropriations and the reporting requirements
provided a vehicle for legislative oversight of the implementation of the appropriations.'8 9 To further underscore this approach, the legislative leaders refused, after the passage of the
1984-1985 budget, to sign Wein Statements.9 0 One legislative
memorandum described some of the reasons for this posture:
[Olne of the accomplishments of this year's budget negotiation
was the inclusion of language which would make a repeat of last
year's "impoundment" action indefensible if not impossible. Retaining the Wein language in question would undermine this position. . . . [I]t is our affirmative position that as a legal and policy
matter the executive cannot react to fiscal difficulties at the expense of enacted programs without the participation of the legislature. Thus, we should not subscribe to language which suggests
a contrary position. 91
The reasons for this response are evident. From the legislative perspective, the impoundments were the result of the Executive's failure to honor a series of agreements which, in their
view, served as the basis of the resolution of the budget negotiations. They included agreements concerning: (1) the staffing
levels resulting from the restorations;9 2 (2) the impact of early

188. N.Y. Times, Jan. 18, 1984, at B2, col. 2.
189. For an example of the language, see supra note 10 & 13.
190. See supra note 179.
191. Memo to Sen. Manfred Ohrenstein from the Author (Apr. 1984) (copy available
at the Pace Law Review).
192. See supra Table II.
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retirements, 9 ' and other components of the Statewide Personnel
Reduction Plan on CUNY, SUNY, OMH, and OMRDD;9 4 (3)
the use of a $20 million appropriation;9 5 (4) and the existence
and amount of executive management authority and the condition for its use.
Despite these justifications, the legislative response was
somewhat surprising, given its historical acquiescence to the Executive's domination over the budget. These responses are even
more unique because they were directed by the Speaker of the
Assembly, a member of the same party as the Governor. This
can only be explained in the context of a growing legislative
commitment to fulfill its constitutional responsibilities.
Over the last decade, members of the New York Legislature
have become increasingly aware of their independent legislative
responsibilities and more confident that they can fulfill them. At
the same time there has been an expanding use of professional
staff that has been both the product and in turn the creator of
this growing legislative self-awareness. Legislative independence
has been institutionalized by the selection of legislative leaders
who share this vision of legislative responsibility.
The focus of this legislative effort has primarily been on
lawmaking. Thus, in 1981, in the face of a crisis in the capital
stock of the transportation system servicing New York City and
its surrounding region, the Legislature, basically without executive participation, fashioned a $5 billion capital renewal program. '9 Similar examples affecting housing 9 ' and the environment,' 8 can be pointed to in legislation. The response to 19831984 impoundments, indicates that the Legislature is now willing to assume its oversight role as well as its lawmaking duties.
As Frank Mauro, Secretary to the Assembly Ways and Means
Committee, stated: "The Legislature is becoming more vigilant;
it is exercising oversight powers more than it has before. It is an

193. See supra text accompanying notes 95-98 and 123-27.
194. See supra text accompanying notes 100-28.
195. See supra text accompanying notes 131-33.
196. Transportation System Assistance and Financing Act of 1981, ch. 314, 1981
N.Y. Laws 1396.
197. The Omnibus Housing Act of 1983, ch. 403, 1983 N.Y. Laws 1777.
198. See, e.g., New York State Returnable Container Act, N.Y. ENVLT. CONSERV. LAW
§§ 27-1001 to -1019 (McKinney 1984).
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indication of the maturing of the institution."1 99
Oversight is of course a fundamental function of the Legislature. It tests the premises on which law is based, "to find out,
after a law is passed what happened as a consequence."2 0 0 It
controls the bureaucracy's "inherent tendencies to be parochial,
to aggregate powers."' 0 ' The oversight function is, however, a
difficult function to perform. Speaking about the United States
Congress, James L. Sundquist has reported:
Oversight was neglected ...

because members found the function

politically unrewarding in relation to the time and effort that
were required. It was tedious work, often technical, requiring
careful preparation .to be done well. The Government was too big,
anyway, for "continuous watchfulness" of more than a small fraction of its activities. Except in instances where the prospect of
gaining headlines through exposing misconduct existed, oversight
therefore had little appeal to the typical senator or representative. And even in those cases, committees might be deterred by
considerations of party loyalty, if the administration and the congressional majority were of the same political persuasion, or by
fear of interest groups that might be offended. Or committee
members might be deterred by the cozy relations that often exist
202
between the overseer and the overseen.
Although the size of state government is substantially
smaller than the federal government, the oversight difficulties
are compounded by the part-time status of the members of state
legislatures. Because of the nature of the state legislative process, there are constant diversions, which make meaningful oversight difficult. These difficulties are further exacerbated when
the agency whose actions are under review is Division of the
Budget, the mainstay of the "permanent" government. 0 3 Consequently, reliance on executive discretion has been the norm.
Since the commencement of the executive budget process, the
New York Legislature has generally acquiesced to the management initiatives of the Division of the Budget, regardless of their
constitutionality. To a large extent, this acquiescence accounts
199. N.Y. Times, Mar. 18, 1984, at E6, col. 1.

200.

J. SUNDQUIST, THE DECLINE AND RESURGENCE OF CONGRESS 326 (1981).

201. See MAASS, supra note 15, at 8.
202. SUNDQUIST, supra note 201, at 327.
203. See generally THE EXECUTIVE BUDGET, supra note 21.
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for the Division's aggregation of power. It explains the genuine
surprise and consternation at the Legislature's determined and
successful efforts to alter this relationship in the 1984-1985
budget.
IV.

Recommendations

Whether this new relationship becomes permanent depends,
as Mr. Mauro suggests, on legislative vigilance and the continued exercise of its oversight power. Although the task is difficult,
it appears from the New York experience that a variety of steps
may be undertaken to facilitate the process. First and foremost,
with respect to vigilance, the number of informal recommendations and unenacted agreements should be reduced to a minimum. Certainly all that is known to the legislative leadership
when the budget negotiations are completed should be included
in law, unless there is some overriding reason not to. In New
York, for example, there is no credible reason why staffing level
agreements cannot, on a regular basis, become part of the law as
was done in the 1984-1985 budget. Specific staffing levels should
be required as a component of the budget bills the Governor
*submits to the Legislature. This requirement would not hamper
*executive flexibility because it would not encompass setting
staffing level mandates in an unreasonable fashion. The Executive would still retain its power to impound appropriations
under section 42 of the Finance Law and to transfer funds under
section 51 of the Finance Law.
Second, particularly with respect to controversial matters, it
is incumbent upon the Legislature to ensure that the budget
bill's language clearly reflects the budget agreements. Too frequently this language is drafted at the last minute by exhausted
budget analysts. Fiscal committees would benefit by having their
own counsel whose sole responsibilities are to clarify and ensure
consistency in the budget language.
The third recommendation relates to legislative intent. In a
judicial setting the admission of external documents depends
upon a court's determination of the existence of an internal ambiguity. 0 4 Thus, to ensure the probative value of reports such as

204. See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
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the Report of the Fiscal Committees on the Executive
Budget,20 5 beyond the political arena, significant passages from
legislative reports should be included in the budget bills themselves. These suggestions are designed to clarify legislative mandates with respect to the implementation of the budget. The inclusion of these mandates in law will provide objective standards
against which the Legislature can measure executive action.
Overseeing executive activities presents another problem.
Although interest group complaints are valuable, they often
come too late and it is hard to discern an overall picture from
them. A much surer method of oversight for a part-time legislature is to require the Executive to report to the Legislature on
budget implementation. To different degrees, states have focused on this methodology. 06 In New York, the Executive is required to provide the Legislature with quarterly financial plan
updates in forms suitable for comparison with earlier submitted
financial plans. The quarterly plan must contain an explanation
of any major deviation from prior plans. 07 Moreover, the comptroller must submit monthly reports containing a "complete
statement of disbursements, expenditures, receipts and revenues
for the prior month and year-to-date. 2 08s This case study indicates that this is not sufficient. In the 1984-1985 budget, the Director of the Budget was required to submit, to the Legislature,
implementation plans for satisfying the mandated staffing levels,
regular reports concerning staffing level status with an explanation of any variance and its impact on service, and steps to eliminate the variance. In addition, the Legislature must receive advance notice of any "proposed actions which . . . could prevent
the attainment of the average filled position levels . . . and the
circumstance and conditions to which these actions relate. 0 ,
Provisions like these should be permanent. They should be expanded to include advance notice of decisions to limit any category of spending. For example, the Executive should be required

205. See supra note 60.
206. See generally YONDORF, A LEGISLATOR'S GUIDE TO BUDGET OVERSIGHT AFTER
THE APPROPRIATIONS ACT HAS PASSED (1983) (report of the National Conference of State
Legislators).
207. N.Y. STATE FIN. LAW § 23 (McKinney Supp. 1984-1985).
208. Id. § 8(9-b).
209. State Operations, supra note 3, at 333.
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to give the Legislature advance notice of an impoundment, pursuant to section 42 of the Finance Law.210 Finally, in New York
the chairpersons of the fiscal committees should exercise their
power under section 8(9) of the Finance Law2 ' to require the
comptroller to provide information to the Legislature in a fashion that corresponds to the form of the budget bills.
These recommendations are designed to end acquiescence to
the Executive and to develop a manageable informational system for a part-time legislature. Managing information and measuring it against legislative standards requires persistence. In
most instances, a part-time legislature can find this persistence
by relying on full-time staffs. It is incumbent upon legislative
leaders and members to ensure that the full-time staffs are
aware of the legislative oversight responsibility and that they are
authorized to exercise this responsibility on behalf of the Legislature. This process is beginning in New York. Recently, the
Ways and Means Committee began a series of in-depth analyses
of the responsibilities, resources, and overall performance capabilities of the various state agencies. The first report in the series has already been completed.2 1 2 Whether it can become a fixture in the legislative-executive relationship, in New York or
elsewhere, remains to be seen.

210. N.Y. STATE FIN. LAW § 42 (McKinney 1974). For a discussion of this section, see
supra text accompanying note 75-81.
211. N.Y. STATE FIN. LAW § 8(9) (McKinney 1974).
212. See N.Y. ST. ASSEMBLY WAYS & MEANS COMM., REPORT ON THE DEPARTMENT OF
ENVIRONMENTAL CONSERVATION: A PROGRAM AND BUDGET HISTORY (Jan. 1985).

